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Gentrification as Injustice: A Relational Egalitarian Approach to Urban Housing 
Tyler Zimmer 
 
This paper focuses on the nature of the landlord/tenant ​relationship​ in uncontrolled rental 
housing markets. I argue that relational egalitarianism--the view that our social and political 
relations to one another ought not involve arbitrary power asymmetries--gives us moral reasons 
to criticize this relationship. In particular, I try to show that landlord/tenant relationships involve 
objectionable forms of economic subordination--more specifically, relations that involve 
exploitation and marginalization--as well as political inequality. I conclude the paper with some 
reflections on policy solutions to the problems I identify. Contrary to the consensus among most 
economists and government officials at least, not to mention landlords, I maintain that rent 
control should be seen a legitimate and effective tool--among others--for curbing the power of 
landlords and thereby protecting tenants. 
 
Introduction 
Rents in large U.S. cities are skyrocketing to unprecedented heights, leading many commentators 
to speak of a “rental crisis” for tenants. In San Francisco--one of the nation’s most expensive 
rental markets--total rent recently reached $12.8 billion, up more than 13.5 percent from the 
previous year. Average rent recently hit a record high of $3,458 a month.  In New York City, the 1
figures are no less alarming. Minimum wage earners would have to work more than 98 hours per 
1 See Pender (“Average S.F. Rent”). 
 
week in order to afford the average market rate one-bedroom apartment.  In Manhattan’s West 2
Village, small businesses, too, are being displaced at an alarming rate due to sharp rent increases, 
some surging from $16,000/month to $42,000/month in a single year.  In Chicago, more than 3
half of renters are paying more than 30 percent of their income for housing.  In all cases, there is 4
every reason to think rents will continue to rise sharply in the coming years. The trends are 
similar in countless cities across the country.  And, of course, with soaring rental prices comes 5
large-scale displacement of entire communities of tenants who cannot afford the new, drastically 
more expensive status quo.  6
In what follows, I argue that this state of affairs represents a form of injustice. However, 
unlike many treatments of this matter, my argument begins by acknowledging that there is much 
more at stake here than the affordability of housing per se or the amount of income a tenant 
might be compelled to relinquish to the landlord. Whereas much of the debate about housing 
2 See National Low Housing Income Coalition (​Out of Reach​). 
3 See Wu (“Why Are There So Many Shuttered Storefronts?”) 
4 See Newman (“Half of Chicago Renters”). 
5 For corroborating data and for a look at broader trends, see Sinai (“Rental Affordability 
Crisis”); and Lightfeld (“State of New York Rental Affordability”). Also see local market reports 
by Zillow.com. 
6 This need not, but often does, involve the large-scale displacement of immigrants and racial 
minorities. On how this is playing out in the Bay Area, see Ling (“Black and Latino 
Displacement”). For information on how similar dynamics are at work in Chicago’s historically 
Mexican neighborhood, Pilsen, see Lulay (“Pilsen Gets Whiter”). 
 
 
markets focuses on how specific policies affect overall welfare or the distribution of 
income--both important issues, to be sure--this paper instead focuses on the nature of the 
landlord/tenant ​relationship​ in uncontrolled rental markets. I argue that relational 
egalitarianism--the view that our social and political relations to one another ought not involve 
arbitrary power asymmetries--gives us moral reasons to criticize this relationship. In particular, I 
try to show that landlord/tenant relationships involve objectionable forms of economic 
subordination--more specifically, relations that involve exploitation and marginalization--as well 
as political inequality. These three inegalitarian features--economic exploitation, 
marginalization, and political subordination--form the basis of three logically distinct moral 
criticisms of the landlord/tenant relationship, and I explore each of them separately and at length 
in what follows.  For the sake of precision and specificity, I will restrict the geographical scope 7
of the argument in this paper to a handful of sufficiently large and dense urban centers in the 
7 To clarify: the three criticisms are logically independent in the sense that a relation could be 
exploitative but not marginalizing or politically subordinating, marginalizing but not exploitative 
or politically subordinating, and so on. There are numerous ways in which any given relation 
could be inegalitarian, and if relational egalitarianism is true, therefore unjust. It remains true, 
however, that the moral arguments advanced here rely on a shared normative framework, 
relational egalitarianism, whereby a relation in unjust in virtue of containing within it some form 
of social domination--an asymmetry whereby one party is subject to the arbitrary power of 
another.  
 
 
United States where renting is extremely common: New York City, Chicago, and the San 
Francisco Bay Area.  8
I conclude the paper with some reflections on policy solutions to the problems I identify. 
Contrary to the consensus among most economists and government officials at least, not to 
mention landlords, I maintain that rent control should be seen a legitimate and effective 
tool--among others--for curbing the power of landlords and thereby protecting tenants. I do not 
claim that is the ​only ​viable means of accomplishing this aim--and still less do I claim that it is 
the uniquely best policy for doing so in every rental housing market.  I do claim, however, that it 9
8 In making this scope restriction, however, I don’t thereby mean to suggest that the argument 
here does not apply more broadly--I regard this as an open question. 
9 There are a number of different policy strategies one might adopt to try to deal with the moral 
problems I examine in this paper. In a sense, the most flat-footed solution to the injustices built 
into the landlord/tenant relationship would be to abolish it entirely. Timothy Brennan, for 
example, suggests that some form of public ownership of all relatively fixed assets, such as land 
and buildings, could be the only normatively acceptable way of thinking about the 
matter--though he does acknowledge that “if this is politically untenable or ethically 
impermissible as a confiscation, compromise policies may be required.” See Brennan (“Market 
Failure,” 79). This strikes me as an understatement--compromise policies, as he calls them, are 
obviously needed in the short run if not indefinitely. Examples of such policies might include 
increasing the supply of housing stock directly (building public housing) or indirectly 
(stimulating private investment), devising ways of enabling tenants to cooperatively own and 
manage their own buildings, giving vouchers or subsidies to tenants to enable them to avoid 
 
 
can act as an effective counterweight in the here and now to economically inegalitarian forces at 
work in uncontrolled rental markets--and, by democratizing the questions of housing and 
membership, it can promote greater political equality among city residents. If successful, then, 
the argument will have shown both that the landlord/tenant relationship has certain constitutive 
inegalitarian features and that rent control--in conjunction with a handful of related policies--can 
play an effective role in remedying these injustices in the cities I named above. 
 
Relational Egalitarianism 
Since the argument that follows uses a relational egalitarian framework to analyze the character 
of landlord/tenant relationships, a few words about that framework are necessary. Egalitarians 
are distinguished by their emphasis on the importance of equality in moral and political matters. 
For the ​relational​ egalitarian, however, equality is defined as a specific kind of relationship 
being displaced, and so on. Which bundle of policies applies best to any given situation will be 
context-sensitive, but I want to stress that there are a few unique advantages to rent control that 
other methods appear to lack. Given that the problem I highlight isn’t rental unaffordability per 
se, means of increasing the overall share of affordable properties in a given city may not actually 
prevent some of the injustices involved in gentrification at all. For example, suppose that you are 
displaced from a particular district or neighborhood because of soaring rental costs, but other 
affordable options in other parts of the city are available--this is better than nothing, to be sure, 
but it doesn’t change the fact that you are being forcibly removed from a community that means 
a great deal to you. I examine this matter more, later in the paper. I am grateful to an anonymous 
reviewer at ​Public Affairs Quarterly​ for pushing me to think more about this question. 
 
 
among persons rather than a specific distribution of goods.  Equality, in this relational sense, is 10
counterposed to relations of domination. The leading thought is that I fail to relate to you as an 
equal if I stand above you and treat you as a mere object or tool for achieving my ends. In cases 
such as this, I am situated in such a way that I can exercise arbitrary power over you--power you 
have neither authorized, nor freely endorsed--in order to get you to serve me. In such a 
relationship, my rational decision-making powers and ability to make valid claims are 
acknowledged, but yours are not. By dominating you in this way, I regard myself as an agent 
with legitimate aims but relate to you as little more than a stepping-stone on the path to 
satisfying my own goals. In this case, we relate neither as peers nor as partners--you are my 
subordinate. This dynamic is operative in paradigmatically unequal social relationships (such as 
we might find under regimes of slavery or serfdom), but it can also be observed in a range of 
more familiar cases as well--indeed, our task in this paper is to see whether the landlord/tenant 
relationship in uncontrolled rental markets exhibits any of these features. 
Succinctly put, relational egalitarians are against the domination of one person (or group) 
by another. Instead, they advocate social and political relationships that permit all to look one 
another in the eye as peers and participate as full partners in ongoing public processes of 
cooperation and self-governance.  Thus the primary concern of the relational egalitarian is not, 11
10 Relational egalitarianism began to coalesce as a coherent framework as criticisms of “luck 
egalitarianism” began to accumulate in the early 2000s. Arguably, much of this research program 
began with Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” For a representative sample of recent 
work on this topic, see Fourie and Schuppert (​Social Equality​). 
11 See Philip Pettit’s “eyeball test” (​On the People’s Terms​, 47). 
 
 
who gets what?, but, what are our basic terms of association and who decides? The primary aim 
of relational egalitarianism is, as Nancy Fraser puts it, “participatory parity” in public life, not 
that everyone possesses equal quantities of privately consumed goods. So, if some have more 
wealth or property than others, that is of secondary importance to the more fundamental question 
of what social and political relationships should be like. 
This, however, does not entail that relational egalitarians are indifferent to how property 
is distributed across individuals. Relational egalitarians can criticize particular distributions of 
property for at least two reasons: (1) because a distribution comes about through a social process 
involving inegalitarian relationships, or (2) because a distributive outcome--regardless of how it 
arose--undermines the equality of ongoing relationships among persons. Both classes of 
judgments derive from a common core--opposition to relationships involving domination. The 
first casts suspicion on the “fruits” of domination, whereas the second regards any distributive 
outcome that could serve as a basis for domination as unacceptable. The first--call them ​social 
process constraints​--encourage us to tether our distributive judgments to the social processes that 
produce distributions in the first place. The second--call them ​outcome constraints​--require that 
we scrutinize distributive outcomes, regardless of how they came about, to see whether or not 
they facilitate relational inequalities. 
It would be an interesting project to look closely at the distribution of ownership in urban 
housing markets over time in order to determine the extent to which their development has been 
impacted by relations of domination. As is well known, the history of urban housing in the 
United States is rife with injustice, ranging from racist discrimination to policies designed to 
 
 
displace poor tenants to enable land grabs by wealthy developers.  A close historical 12
examination of these injustices would undoubtedly lead us to conclude that the status quo should 
be changed in significant respects. But I will not examine this matter any further here, important 
though it is. Instead, for reasons of space and clarity, I will focus exclusively on the grounds that 
outcome constraints provide us for criticizing landlord/tenant relationships. In particular, I will 
argue that the landlord/tenant relationship in urban rental markets conduces to unequal 
relationships in three important senses. For purposes of exposition, I will rely in what follows on 
a somewhat artificial distinction between the economic and the political, with the former 
referring to purely economic market transactions and the latter referring to decision-making 
power when public policy is at stake. I begin by analyzing the economic dimensions of 
landlord/tenant relations, followed by a detailed analysis of their political dimensions. 
 
Landlord/Tenant Relationships: Economic Dimensions 
In economic terms, the landlord/tenant relationship is a market exchange in which the tenant 
exchanges money in return for the use of housing stock owned by the landlord. Now, given how 
common this economic transaction is, it would be understandable to assume that it must have a 
strong ​prima facie​ claim to being ethically unproblematic. After all, provided that she meet her 
contractual obligations to the tenant, doesn’t the landlord deserve to keep all of what the market 
enables her to collect? As we’ll see below, however, the appeal of this idea begins to erode when 
12 For an overview, see Massey and Denton (​American Apartheid​). For a detailed survey of how 
these dynamics played out in Chicago in the twentieth century, see Satter (​Family Properties​). 
 
 
we examine the nature of the transaction more closely, and the unequal power relations that it is 
premised upon. 
The first thing to note is that the rental income collected by the landlord is capital 
income, not labor income.  In other words, rental income is not collected in virtue of labor 13
performed, but in virtue of ownership--just as is true of other forms of capital income such as 
interest, dividends, royalties, and the like.  That is to say, the landlord ​need not​ engage in any 14
productive activity or do anything of service to the tenant in order to collect rent. To be sure, she 
13 This is a standard distinction in economics and finance. For more on the distinction, see 
Piketty (​Capital in the Twenty-First Century​, 45-52); and Piketty (​Economics of Inequality​, 
26-64). Typically, economists who study economic disparities in income divide their subject 
matter into two sub-areas: capital/labor income inequality and labor income inequality (wage 
differentials). We are viewing our primary case in this paper--the landlord/tenant relation--as a 
capital/labor case where one party earns from owning and the other earns from 
working--although our interest is not in the distribution of income between the two parties per se, 
but in the economic and political power dynamics at play. However, I stress that in making this 
distinction and identifying rent as capital income, we haven’t yet settled any of the normative 
issues at stake--it remains to be shown, and indeed I spend the next section trying to show, that 
the economic relation between tenant and landlord is exploitative. 
14 If I inherit GM stock, it’s not the case that someone from GM will call me every quarter to 
make sure that I’ve engaged in productive activity that contributes to the company--it is my 
legally enforced ownership of the shares, and nothing else, that entitles me to the dividends. The 
same is true if I inherit rental properties. 
 
 
must pay building maintenance costs, but she can use her gross rental income to pay others to do 
whatever needs doing (maintain the property, fix things, etc.) and still have plenty left over for 
herself.  In fact, the primary “contribution” of the landlord in the transaction is to grant the 15
tenant permission to use already existing housing stock on a city lot to which the landlord has a 
legally-enforced title--and, as I just made clear, it won’t stop the landlord from collecting rent on 
her asset if it turns out she doesn’t do anything to maintain the property (but instead pays others 
to do so from the gross rent she collects).  Whether she engages in any productive labor in the 16
15 Needless to say, the assumption that landlords consistently cover maintenance costs does not 
always hold in practice. I sidestep this complication, however, and for present purposes suppose 
that the assumption is true. 
16 ​Technically, all the landlord does ​qua landlord​ is ​grant permission​ for tenants to use something 
that other people built and that others now maintain, and granting permission is not a productive 
activity. Certainly granting permission it is not on par with doing the work of maintaining a 
building, fixing things when they break, shoveling snow and salting sidewalks, and so on. It’s 
not on par with those activities because the building would not be useful to tenants without these 
activities, whereas the landlord’s granting permission is only necessary on the condition that her 
legal property rights are coercively enforced by the state. We can imagine a world in which the 
legal titles of landlords were not respected and people used their buildings without 
permission--but we cannot imagine a world in which no one builds or maintains rental properties 
in which tenants still have a place to live. The point here is to highlight the power differentials 
between the tenant and landlord. As we’ll see, the argument for the charge of exploitation is that 
 
 
service of the tenant is neither here nor there--what matters is that she holds the legal title to the 
property and, accordingly, to whatever market rent it commands. This, indeed, is the whole point 
of acquiring income-generating capital assets in the first place. As economist Thomas Piketty 
puts it, “the advantage of owning things is that one can continue to consume and accumulate 
without having to work, or at any rate consume and accumulate more than one could produce on 
one’s own.”  17
Whereas the landlord derives income from ownership, most tenants earn their income 
exclusively from working. To be sure, this is not true of all tenants, but it is true of most--I’ll 
restrict my discussion in what follows only to tenants for whom this is true. Thus we can view a 
fraction of the average tenant’s working day as covering the costs of rent. This means, then, that 
a percentage of the time the tenant spends working--expending her energies in a way she would 
not otherwise do--in an average week is devoted to sustaining the rental income reaped by her 
landlord. Were her rent to increase but her wages remain constant, she would need to work 
longer in order to retain use of her existing rental housing--and, of course, the extra income 
earned by working longer hours in this case would go to the landlord. 
As we’ve seen, the typical landlord is in a different economic position. Landlords, as 
such, need not devote any time to working in order to receive income from owning rental 
properties since, in principle, they could hire others to do any necessary work and still earn a 
profit. Landlords are not obligated to expend their energies working to sustain the tenant, but the 
the latter is able to use her wealth as leverage in the uncontrolled rental market to get the tenant 
to part with, in an unreciprocated way, some of the fruits of her labor. 
17 Piketty, ​Capital in the Twenty-First Century​, 121. 
 
 
tenant is required to expend her energies laboring in order to sustain the landlord. Indeed, as 
we’ll see shortly, I will try to show that this is a case of unequal exchange, that is, “an 
unreciprocated net transfer of goods or labor time from one party to another.”  Conceding that 18
not all tenant/landlord relations fit this bill does not mean that this is an inaccurate 
generalization.  19
18 Vrousalis, “Exploitation, Vulnerability,” 138. 
19 The generalization is useful and indeed is true of owners of the majority of rental housing 
stock. But it is also true that the class of landlords is far from homogenous and many owners of 
rental property do not fit the description above. Some small-scale landlords, for instance, own a 
building with two residential units and reside in one and rent the other to offset the costs of their 
mortgage and property taxes--in this case, rental income generated purely from ownership may 
not even exceed maintenance costs for the property. Some landlords might be unable--because of 
a physical disability, say--to earn income from working. Any defensible rent control ordinance 
must take account of these differences and avoid subjecting these small-scale landlords to laws 
designed primarily to regulate the conduct of large-scale landlords who more closely 
approximate the ideal type put forward above. As successful rent control ordinances in Canada 
and Western Europe demonstrate, these differences can be accommodated by crafting rent 
regulations in such a way as to make exceptions for those who don’t fit the ideal-typical mold. 
 
 
In what follows I shall take the above as an ideal type--in the Weberian sense--and offer a 
normative analysis of its structure.  In particular I advance two economic arguments that aim to 20
show that the ideal type involves relational inequality. I’ll argue first that ideal-typical 
landlord/tenant relationships are ​exploitative​. Here, I follow Nicholas Vrousalis, who defines 
exploitation as a form of social domination according to which ​A​ instrumentalizes ​B​’s 
vulnerability for ​A​’s benefit. Second, I argue that the structure of landlord/tenant relations render 
tenants in gentrifying areas liable to suffer ​marginalization​. That is, tenants in gentrifying (or 
soon-to-be gentrifying) areas are likely to be viewed by landlords, developers, and new investors 
as little more than impediments to increasing their profits. In these cases, tenants are liable to be 
treated as mere obstacles to be displaced and removed--pushed to the margins--as quickly as 
possible. These normative arguments apply to the ideal-typical case I outlined above--we’re 
assuming, in other words, that landlords are “pure landlords” and tenants are “pure tenants” and 
that both contract in an unregulated, uncontrolled rental market. To the extent that specific 
real-life examples depart from this ideal type, the analysis I offer would need to be adjusted.  21
 
20 Notice that an “ideal type” for Weber does not refer to anything morally or politically ideal--it 
is merely a simplifying abstraction that permits us to make useful generalizations in the course of 
analyzing complex social phenomena. 
21 In other words, the normative argument here holds only on the condition that the 
landlord/tenant relationship approximates the ideal type described above. That doesn’t entail that 
rent control is unjust if an actual relationship fails to track this ideal type--it simply means that a 
different normative analysis would be required. 
 
 
Exploitation 
I now turn to the matter of exploitation. Before examining the landlord/tenant relationship in 
particular, I must first say a bit more about exploitation in general. In a recent article, Nicholas 
Vrousalis argues that I exploit you just in case I instrumentalize your vulnerability in order to 
extract a net benefit for myself. Importantly, Vrousalis limits this definition to economic 
exploitation, since the only way to eliminate all exploitation would be to eliminate all forms of 
vulnerability, which, as he rightly points out, would be neither possible nor desirable. By 
“economic” he means “related to the basic structure of society, that is, to its fundamental, 
publicly observable, institutional features.”  Thus the precise form of exploitation we’re 22
interested in identifying in tenant/landlord relations is as follows: ​A​ economically exploits ​B​ if 
and only if ​A​ and ​B​ are embedded in a systematic relationship in which ​A​ instrumentalizes ​B​’s 
economic vulnerability to extract a net benefit. It is clear that this is a case of relational 
inequality--when I exploit you, I do not relate to you as a peer or equal partner. Instead, I take 
advantage of a power asymmetry between us so I can use you as a mere means for my 
enrichment. In particular, societies that institutionalize and rely fundamentally upon exploitation 
fail to satisfy a basic egalitarian desideratum: that the basic structure of social institutions ought 
to facilitate a fair system of social cooperation for mutual benefit among equal citizens. We do 
not cooperate as equals if you have the power to compel me to toil for your benefit whereas I 
have no other reasonable option but to submit. If I leverage my position of power over you to 
wrest an unreciprocated transfer of goods or labor time from you, then in an important sense, I 
22 Vrousalis, “Exploitation, Vulnerability,” 136. 
 
 
violate the cooperative spirit of the relational egalitarian project and, accordingly, we should 
view such arrangement as presumptively unjust. 
In what follows, I’ll make use of Vrousalis’s specific conception of exploitation to 
analyze tenant/landlord relations, but other popular accounts can be substituted for this 
conception without any substantial changes to the argument advanced here--in other words, one 
need not be convinced of Vrousalis’s particular analysis of exploitation to be moved by the 
argument that follows.  Before I continue, however, one further expository point must be made. 23
When I say B’s ​vulnerability​ is being instrumentalized, I might mean that she is vulnerable in 
one of two general senses. She might be ​absolutely ​vulnerable--that is, desperate because she is 
lacking basic goods--or she might be ​relationally ​vulnerable--that is, vulnerable to the predations 
of a dominant person (or group) who has the discretionary power to withhold access to 
23 Take, for example, Mikhail Valdman’s conception of exploitation, which, unlike that of 
Vrousalis, defines exploitation as the extraction of “excessive benefits” rather than any net 
benefit whatsoever. See Valdman (“Theory of Wrongful Exploitation”). Or consider, as Alan 
Wertheimer has argued, the view that exploitation occurs when ​A​ takes advantage of ​B​ in a way 
that is ​unfair​ to ​B​. See Wertheimer (​Exploitation​). I find Vrousalis’s view more convincing than 
these alternatives, but that is neither here nor there so far as this paper is concerned. Either of 
these alternatives to Vrousalis’s position would yield the same result in my argument. I’m 
grateful to an anonymous reviewer at ​Public Affairs Quarterly​ for challenging me to think more 
about the extent to which the idea of extracting a net benefit is essential to my argument about 
exploitation. 
 
 
constituents of her well-being.  As we’ll see, it is this latter form of vulnerability that is most 24
important in the case of landlord/tenant relations. More specifically, however, it is ​economic 
forms of relational vulnerability that are most significant--in other words, forms of vulnerability 
according to which ​A​ has economic power over ​B​ because ​A​ enjoys effective ownership of 
certain resources--land in our case--that ​B​ needs (in order to flourish) but lacks. To borrow an 
illustration from Vrousalis that illustrates how this form of vulnerability works, say that “​A​ owns 
a water-producing well. . . . If ​A​’s ownership is fully enforced, ​B​ needs water, and ​B​ has no 
independent access to water, then ​B​ is economically vulnerable to ​A​.” In what follows, I’ll argue 
that tenants are principally vulnerable in this specifically economic, relational sense.  25
24 For the purposes of the present paper, this formulation will suffice. But it bears noting that in a 
work in progress, I argue that we should modify this aspect of Vrousalis’s approach as well, by 
removing the reference to well-being. I argue that we are relationally vulnerable to suffering 
exploitation even if it is ​not ​the case that someone holds the keys to something that will enable us 
to flourish. For us to be vulnerable, all that need occur is that a person stands above us, able to 
wield some form of arbitrary power over us. Suppose, for instance, that I was addicted to a drug 
that reduced my well-being and you had the discretionary power to withhold my next fix. You 
might still exploit me in this case even though the power you wield over me is not that of 
withholding an objective constituent of my well-being. 
25 But aren’t would-be tenants vulnerable in the absolute sense if they lack housing? This will be 
true of those who are barred access, by market forces, from any housing whatsoever. But most 
prospective tenants in rental markets face a choice not between homelessness and tenancy, but 
 
 
How is the tenant relationally vulnerable to the landlord? The tenant in the market for 
rental housing is typically under compulsion to quickly find a place to live. And, of course, 
housing is a basic constituent of one’s well-being if anything is--indeed it should be seen as an 
example of what John Rawls would have called a “primary good.”  As Anna Stilz rightly points 26
out, “occupancy of a particular place is of central importance for an individual’s life-plans and 
projects.”  What’s more, residing in a particular district or neighborhood is often tied up with 27
economic, cultural, and political membership in particular local communities as well as with 
one’s sense of home and, indeed, with one’s very identity.  It’s not simply a matter of whether 28
the tenant has a place to live--but ​where​ she can live and who has the authority to decide. Thus 
there is a lot at stake for the tenant teetering on the edge of being priced out of her home and 
between tenancy in a particular community versus tenancy somewhere else (perhaps in a 
separate district, city, or state). 
26 Social primary goods refer to socially produced goods that any rational person can be 
presumed to want, no matter what else it is that they might want. They are “all purpose means” 
that everyone needs in order to pursue whatever rational life plans they might individually 
endorse. Rawls does not explicitly mention housing, but his discussion does speak of wealth as 
well as the social bases of self-respect--both of which have intimate connections with housing. 
For more on social primary goods, see Rawls (​Theory of Justice​, 54-55). 
27 Stilz, “Occupancy Rights,” 334. 
28 See Radin (“Residential Rent Control”) for an extended defense of this point. One need not 
accept her entire argument to find in her article a convincing case of this specific point about 
residency and identity. 
 
 
community. This is an important sense in which the landlord/tenant transaction is different from 
other more run-of-the-mill market exchanges between buyers and sellers of ordinary 
commodities. 
Contrast the situation of the tenant with the predicament of the landlord who possesses 
the power to withhold these key constituents of the tenant’s well-being. The landlord--according 
to our ideal type, at least--is not under any compulsion to sign a lease quickly or else forgo a 
primary good or basic constituent of her well-being. Nor is the landlord’s membership in any 
particular community tied up with her ownership of particular parcels of land or her status as the 
recipient of rents from tenants living in a particular area. Of course, it’s possible that the 
landlord’s identity might be partially bound up with her status as landlord, but this is quite 
different from the situation of the tenant. The tenant’s identity comes into play only insofar as 
her residence in a particular district or neighborhood affects her sense of home and shapes her 
interactions with others. The tenant’s identity is not implicated ​because​ she is a tenant, but 
because her tenancy enables her to live in a particular community. The case of the landlord, then, 
is not analogous vis-à-vis the question of identity and membership. 
This has important implications. First, it means that the landlord can easily walk away 
from any particular market negotiation with an existing or prospective tenant, because the 
landlord’s identity, membership, and well-being are not immediately or directly at stake. What’s 
more, many landlords can afford to allow a rental unit to sit unused for months or more, whereas 
the tenant cannot reasonably forgo housing for any length of time. Of course, the prospective 
tenant does reserve the formal right to walk away from any particular market interaction with a 
would-be landlord, but her leeway in being able to effectively do this will depend heavily on the 
 
 
supply of affordable rental housing options available, among other factors.  As rents climb ever 29
higher, the options decrease and the tenant’s bargaining power--and hence, her ability to wield 
the threat of exit from the transaction--is weakened.  The more concentrated rental housing 30
ownership is, moreover, the more vulnerable individual tenants will be in the marketplace.  31
Indeed, landlords are aware of these dynamics and are known to use them as bargaining chips in 
market interactions with tenants. It is standard practice for many landlords in uncontrolled 
29 Another relevant consideration is the extent to which the tenant regards her residence in this 
particular apartment as valuable. Depending on the circumstances, this might raise exit costs for 
the tenant considerably. 
30 The reader will note that a variety of factors will increase the tenant’s vulnerability, 
particularly structural factors--such as race, gender, or citizenship status--that constrict the 
options the tenant has (and increase the “exit costs” of withdrawing from the transaction with the 
landlord). Hallie Liberto gives an interesting case in a recent paper wherein a poor college 
student is exploited by his landlord because the latter is able to prey upon (and profit from) his 
vulnerabilities ​qua​ young, uninformed, poor college students. This illustrates the point I’m 
making here, in that the increased vulnerability of the tenant renders her even more exposed to 
exploitation than the ideal-typical case I present where these other important factors--especially 
race and gender--are not at work. See Liberto (“Exploitation and the Vulnerability Clause,” 
623-24). 
31 See Rice (“Logan Square Tenants Protest”) for a concrete case where highly concentrated 
ownership of rental properties in a Chicago neighborhood (Logan Square) has substantially 
increased the vulnerability of individual tenants to both exploitation and marginalization. 
 
 
markets to raise rent year after year--even when no improvements to the property have been 
made,  and even when the hike isn’t justified by keeping pace with inflation--simply because 32
they can bet on the fact that the longer a tenant resides in an apartment, the more she is likely to 
value continued residence there. The characteristics of the tenant/landlord relationship examined 
above demonstrate the ways in which the tenant is relationally vulnerable to--and in some sense, 
dependent upon--the landlord (or perhaps more precisely, the class of landlords in her 
community). What we need to show now, in order to demonstrate the exploitative character of 
this interaction, is (1) that landlords ​instrumentalize ​this vulnerability in order to (2) ​extract a net 
benefit​. 
Can the landlord be said to instrumentalize the tenant’s vulnerability? I begin by noting 
that it is precisely in virtue of this vulnerability that the landlord is able to extract the market rent 
from the tenant in the first place. Landlords as a class can charge you rent for the use of 
something you need to live, only on the condition that your access to it is blocked unless you 
transact with them. When a landlord compels a tenant to pay rent, she is cashing in on this 
vulnerability. It’s obvious that instrumentalization occurs in Vrousalis’s case involving the 
owner of the water well--so long as the well owner’s property rights are fully enforced, the 
person with no independent access to water is at the owner’s mercy and hence, is relationally 
vulnerable to her. Any profits the owner collects--profits being value extracted above and beyond 
what’s needed to maintain the well and cover costs--are collected precisely by seizing upon the 
non-owner’s vulnerability. By analogy, the same is true of ideal-typical tenants and landlords in 
uncontrolled rental markets. Access to housing, as I argued above, is a basic constituent of the 
32 Indeed, these rent increases are often made even as the condition of the property deteriorates. 
 
 
tenant’s well-being. If the ownership rights of the class of landlords are fully enforced--if, that is, 
squatting is coercively prohibited by the state--then the tenant is at the mercy of the class of 
landlords to get access to a basic constituent of her well-being. For most landlords, the goal of 
instrumentalizing this vulnerability to extract profit is the primary motivation for acquiring rental 
properties in the first place. 
As further evidence that landlords in uncontrolled markets instrumentalize this 
vulnerability, we note that the amount of rent that can be extracted will depend, among other 
things, on the ​extent​ of the tenant’s relational vulnerability. Part of this is built into the structure 
of uncontrolled rental markets themselves: the scarcer affordable housing becomes, the more 
vulnerable the tenant is and the greater the proportion of income she can be compelled to 
relinquish to the landlord. On the other hand, if the tenant’s relational vulnerability (the cost of 
exiting the transaction with the landlord) were reduced, for example, we can expect (other things 
equal) the landlord’s bargaining power to decrease and for rents to decrease as well. The extent 
of the relational vulnerability of tenants matters to profit-seeking landlords because it affects the 
amount of rent they can extract. This would not be the case if landlords didn’t respond to--and 
instrumentalize--the economic vulnerability of tenants. 
Does the landlord extract a net benefit from this transaction? That the answer is yes 
follows more or less analytically from the definitions of rent and profit presented above--the 
landlord’s profit is whatever she reaps over and above the cost of reproducing her 
income-generating asset (housing stock). But there’s more to say about this net benefit that is 
germane to our discussion: it also seems true that the transaction involves appropriation--that is, 
 
 
“an unreciprocated net transfer of goods or labor time from one party to another.”  If the tenant 33
and landlord reciprocally interact and exchange equivalents, there is no appropriation. But that is 
not how things work in the ideal typical case--nor is this how things work in rental markets in 
large US cities. The rapid rate of increase in rental prices we’ve seen in the last decade has far 
outpaced maintenance and upkeep costs. It’s not as if there has been a one-to-one relationship 
between rent increases and improvements to rental properties. Many tenants can attest to having 
to relinquish more and more of their hard-earned income to landlords in order to retain access to 
the same unimproved (or in some cases deteriorating) housing stock. It stands to reason that 
tenants would not submit to this unequal exchange--to allowing the landlord to appropriate some 
of the fruits of their labor--unless they were economically vulnerable in some way or another. 
The point about the fruits of the labor of the tenant requires elaboration. Since the ideal 
typical landlord earns rental income from owning rather than working, and since the converse is 
true for the ideal typical tenant, the extraction of rent means that, in effect, the tenant expends a 
certain number of hours a week toiling solely in order to enrich her landlord. In other words, the 
tenant expends some quantity of her powers and energies on a regular basis, increasing the 
wealth of the landlord, but the converse is false.  Relationships of this kind involve the key 34
33 Vrousalis, “Exploitation, Vulnerability,” 138. 
34 Notice that this in no way implies or relies upon the “labor theory of value.” The claim here is 
normative. It has to do primarily with the character of the social relationship between tenant and 
landlord: if I am a tenant, I have no choice but to ​do ​something--expend my energies and time 
doing something I wouldn’t otherwise be inclined to do--for the landlord’s benefit. But the 
landlord need not ​do ​anything--she need not expend any of her energies or any of her time--for 
 
 
elements of exploitation: a power asymmetry regarding access to key resources that is put to use 
to facilitate an unreciprocated transfer of goods or labor time from tenant to landlord. This is not 
the sort of dynamic we expect to emerge from the interaction of peers or equal partners. 
Now, some may have a hard time accepting that a landlord/tenant relationship that 
permits the landlord to profit in ​any​ way is therefore exploitative (and, for that reason, unjust). 
One might agree, for example, that exploitation involves taking advantage of the vulnerability of 
others, but may think that there only exists a genuine injustice when the size or value of the 
advantage reaped by the exploiter is sufficiently large. We might then draw a distinction between 
landlords who enrich themselves by squeezing as much profit as the market will bear from 
hundreds of rental properties, on the one hand, and those who live a comparatively modest life 
by owning their own residence and renting out extra rooms or units to supplement their income, 
on the other. The underlying idea would be that wrongful exploitation only occurs when the 
exploiter reaps ​unfair​ or ​excessive​ benefits from the exploited, where “excessive” can be defined 
in terms of the quantity amassed by the landlord, or in terms of the extent of the burden imposed 
my benefit. This is especially clear when, as often happens, rent increases substantially but 
housing stock remains mostly unimproved. Here is a case where I, the tenant, am obliged to 
devote more of my goods or labor time to enriching the landlord even though she will have done 
no more than grant me permission to use her property, the same property that, only a year ago, 
would have been available to me in exchange for less of my goods or labor time. This evinces an 
unequal exchange, an unreciprocated transfer of goods or labor time. 
 
 
on the tenant.  If we grant either of these modifications of our definition of exploitation, 35
however, the result remains roughly the same: it will still turn out that a large number of existing 
landlord/tenant relations count as (wrongfully) exploitative. Surely the data discussed above 
about the meteoric rise of rents in New York, Chicago, and the Bay Area provide at least strong 
prima facie​ evidence of excessive accumulation of wealth by a small group of landlords at the 
expense of millions of tenants who are increasingly forced to part with a larger and larger share 
of their income to retain their housing. 
Others will object to the argument here by arguing that landlord/tenant relations don’t 
constitute exploitation since the prospective tenant in the marketplace is not being ​coerced​ to 
35 On the tenant end, the burden seems to become unacceptable or unfair when it commands 
greater than a certain percentage of the tenant’s income. It is commonly advised that one spend 
no more--if one can help it!--than 30 percent of one’s income in rent. The trouble with any 
sufficientarian argument is that it relies upon an act of line-drawing that invites the charge of 
arbitrariness, but it seems to me that rents cross a threshold of excess when they command a 
share of the tenant’s income larger than 30 percent or 40 percent--and the bigger the share 
soaked up by rent above this threshold, the more excessive the rate becomes. On the landlord 
end, excessive or unfair rent might be defined in terms of absolute size of the rent collected (the 
diminishing marginal utility of money can serve as a guide here for determining where to draw 
the line) or in terms of its size relative to the income of the tenant. Still another way to gauge 
“excessive” would be in terms of the ratio of maintenance costs to profit. The idea in all three 
cases would be that the landlord in this latter case is gouging the tenant and using her as a mere 
means to accumulate excessive sums of wealth. 
 
 
contract with any particular landlord. Since she is free to refuse the offer of any specific landlord, 
it seems reasonable to say that she has consented and thereby given her reflective endorsement to 
any lease she signs--and where there is consent and reflective endorsement, there doesn’t seem to 
be exploitation. Three things may be said to dispatch this objection. First, as Vrousalis and others 
have shown, coercion is neither necessary nor sufficient for exploitation to occur.  Second, there 36
are, in fact, many cases in which one wishes to continue to occupy one’s home where the only 
way to do that is to continue contracting with a particular landlord. In this case, deciding to 
renew a lease versus moving and signing a new one with a different landlord in a different 
location are qualitatively different options. This produces relational vulnerability between the 
existing landlord and her tenant. But even setting such cases to one side, we can also point out 
that the tenant’s lack of ownership of housing means that she is dependent upon--and more 
importantly, relationally vulnerable to--the ​class ​of landlords as a whole even if she is not 
thereby tethered to any one ​particular ​landlord.  It is, of course, true that the tenant could choose 37
not to transact with a specific landlord or a specific set of landlords in a certain district or city. 
She could, for example, move away to a less expensive district, city, or state--or, provided she 
has the requisite funds, she could attempt to exit the rental market by seeking to purchase 
housing stock of her own. But this does not undermine our case. Here, we need simply to recall 
the points made above about the connections between residency in a particular urban community 
36 Vrousalis, “Exploitation, Vulnerability,” 145-46; Roemer, ​Egalitarian Perspectives​. 
37 I have in mind here a claim about landlords and tenants that is analogous to the argument made 
by G. A. Cohen vis-à-vis capitalists and workers in Cohen (“Structure of Proletarian 
Unfreedom”). 
 
 
and one’s well-being and sense of home and identity. These are weighty considerations that 
make exit costs high for many tenants--and this, as I argued above, is what grounded our 
conclusion that the tenant is relationally vulnerable to the landlord in the first place. 
Let us summarize the argument above. The relationship is exploitative because the 
landlord instrumentalizes the tenant’s vulnerability in order to extract a net benefit. I say that the 
ideal typical tenant/landlord relationship is such that the tenant is relationally vulnerable to the 
landlord. This is so because the landlord enjoys effective control over certain resources--land in 
our case--that the tenant needs (in order to flourish) but lacks. The tenant is also vulnerable if her 
identity and membership in a particular community depend on her residing in a particular rental 
property or specific neighborhood, whereas this is not the case with the landlord who merely 
uses her property as an income-generating asset. There is much more at stake for the tenant than 
for the landlord, and this gives the latter substantial bargaining advantages in negotiations. I say 
that landlords instrumentalize this vulnerability because they make use of it in order to extract 
rent--and not just any rent, but the highest rent possible in any given context. This enables the 
landlord to appropriate the fruits of the tenant’s labor, whereas the reverse is not the case. The 
extraction of rent involves an unreciprocated transfer of goods or labor time from tenant to 
landlord, since our ideal-typical tenant earns income from working, whereas the landlord 
accumulates income merely from owning (by extracting rent from the tenant). This involves an 
unacceptable form of relational inequality--and, accordingly, we have moral reasons to seek to 
either mitigate the damaging aspects of the relationship or to replace it entirely. 
 
Marginalization 
 
 
So much for exploitation. I now turn to the issue of marginalization. I’ll argue that the 
ideal-typical landlord/tenant relationship renders the tenant vulnerable to marginalization, 
particularly in contexts where rents are rising rapidly across the board. By marginalization, I 
mean an unequal relationship according to which ​A​ keeps ​B​ on the “margins” and excluded from 
the “center”--where this metaphor can refer to a variety of economic and political asymmetries 
(although here our focus is economic). Generally speaking, the metaphor of being pushed to the 
margins refers to groups that are, as Iris Marion Young puts it, “expelled from useful 
participation in social life and thus potentially subjected to severe material deprivation and even 
extermination.”  To be marginalized is, then, to ​not count​, to ​not be someone​ who matters in a 38
given arena.  It is, we might say, to go ​unrecognized​ or to be ​misrecognized​ by others--to be 39
38 See Young, ​Justice and the Politics of Difference​, 53. 
39 For purposes of exposition, it is useful to contrast marginalization with our earlier discussion 
of exploitation. In some respects, marginalization and exploitation are two different sides of the 
same coin. Exploitation involves instrumentalization whereby the exploited party is treated as a 
mere tool or object for use by another. In some circumstances, however, exploiting a group can 
unintentionally give it a potentially liberatory form of social power. The exploited have the 
power--by use of the strike weapon, say--to withhold their labor and thereby grind the exploiter’s 
wealth accumulation to a halt. This strategic maneuver is not available to marginalized groups, 
however. Whereas exploiters rely on the exploited to extract wealth (or other benefits), dominant 
groups are not similarly reliant upon the marginalized. If the exploited are viewed by their 
superiors as useful instruments for self-enrichment, the marginalized are viewed as useless or 
invisible at best, or at worst, as mere obstacles to be displaced and removed. 
 
 
invisible or belittled when one ought to have standing as a full partner in some sphere of social 
life.  40
Marginalization is a key example of relational inequality. When I’m marginalized in a 
specific context, I cease to enjoy standing as a full partner, as a peer of my fellows in that arena. 
As an equal, I can expect forms of respect and recognition that I do not enjoy if I’m 
marginalized. As an equal, I can expect that my peers will see me as a being to whom some form 
of reasonable justification is owed when decisions about my interests are at stake. In particular, 
when I am an equal, I can expect to have a seat at the table when those decisions are being made. 
When I’m marginalized, in contrast, I am kept at arm’s length while those permitted to enjoy full 
standing make authoritative, binding decisions without needing to consult me. Marginalization, 
then, is a form of subordination in which one is regarded as relatively unimportant, 
unauthoritative, and lacking the standing to make valid claims on others. This dynamic of 
subordination and exclusion can arise in a variety of contexts, but I am principally concerned 
here with how it arises in economic contexts. Let’s apply this discussion, then, to the economic 
dimensions of (ideal-typical) landlord/tenant relations. 
There are at least three ways in which uncontrolled rental markets can lead to the 
marginalization of tenants. First, because there is no ceiling on how high--or how quickly--rents 
can appreciate in uncontrolled housing markets, beneficial new investments in a neighborhood 
often have paradoxical consequences for tenants vulnerable to being priced out of their homes. 
The dynamic is a familiar one in urban communities in the United States today: a new business 
40 For more on the significance of recognition for egalitarianism, see Fraser (​Fortunes of 
Feminism​, 159-74). 
 
 
opens--a new grocery store, say--that provides a generally desirable good or service and, for a 
time at least, virtually all residents benefit. Certainly, having a new grocery store nearby is better 
than living in a food desert, for all residents.  But new investments of this kind also tend to 41
cause property values and rents to rise--and this is more true, the more new investment pours in. 
The paradox, then, is this: working-class and poor tenants have a rational basis for feeling 
ambivalent about economic improvements to their neighborhood--indeed, in some cases, too 
many improvements (too much new investment) will actually represent a clear ​threat ​to their 
continued residency in the area. In short, uncontrolled rental markets create paradoxical 
situations where economic improvements can actually marginalize entire layers of residents by 
threatening their status as members in good standing in the community. 
When a wave of new investment pours into a neighborhood, as I just discussed, this can 
have the paradoxical effect of both improving the area economically but also threatening the 
membership of existing residents.  But there is an additional problem as well. As new 42
investment builds and rents rise, new investors and some existing business owners will have 
reason to cater to the preferences not of existing residents, but of more wealthy residents who 
have yet to move into the district in large numbers. In other words, in a context where 
investment, rents, and property values are all steadily increasing, it makes good business sense 
41 ​The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) defines food deserts as geographical areas 
without access to fresh fruit, vegetables, and other healthy foods, due to a lack of grocery stores, 
farmers’ markets, and so forth. 
42 As an ​Onion ​article irreverently put it in a recent headline: “Neighborhood Starting to Get Too 
Safe for Family to Afford.” 
 
 
for business owners to bet on demographic changes and appeal to the (more expensive) 
preferences of more affluent future residents. Working-class tenants are then liable to find 
themselves in a position where businesses in the neighborhood progressively appeal less and less 
to their preferences. The result, then, is that one’s desires for certain goods and services matter 
less and less to those making decisions about how to organize commerce in the neighborhood. 
This problem is especially acute in cases where racial or cultural minorities are the groups whose 
preferences are being progressively ignored.  In many cases, this will be not simply a matter of 43
qualitatively different preferences, but of the mere ability to pay for the goods or services in 
43 We are focusing on the class dimensions of this process, but the racial and cultural dimensions 
are morally significant as well. Consider, then, a case where working-class African American 
communities who depend on, as Tommie Shelby describes it, a variety of culturally specific 
businesses and institutions, including “hair salons and barbershops, clothing stores, places of 
worship, restaurants, bookstores, cinemas, music and dance venues, art galleries and theaters, 
and retail outlets that sell black hair-care and skin-care products” (Shelby, “Integration, 
Inequality, and Imperatives,” 272). If soaring rents mean that a more affluent and, as is often the 
case, a more predominantly white set of new residents flood into the neighborhood, a predictable 
consequence will be the decline of many of these establishments. Thus even before residential 
rents become unaffordable and literally force previous tenants out, new investors and 
commercial landlords (and even some existing businesses) will have reason to cater less and less 
to the declining population of working-class black folks in the district. Similar dynamics can be 
observed when soaring rents disperse or displace establishments that cater to the culturally 
specific needs of immigrant communities. 
 
 
question. Imagine, for example, a rapidly gentrifying neighborhood where expensive restaurant 
and high-end retail investment proliferates even though the existing residents cannot reasonably 
afford to patronize these businesses. The message this sends to many existing residents is clear: 
“We don’t want or need your business, and we’re betting on the fact that you’ll be priced out 
before long.” In short, the message is that certain groups don’t ​count​, don’t ​matter ​as much as 
others, when it comes to deciding what changes will be made to the neighborhood. This is as 
clear an example of marginalization as we are likely to find. 
Let’s examine one additional way in which tenants in uncontrolled housing markets are 
vulnerable to being marginalized economically. In a context where residential rents are 
increasing rapidly, ideal-typical landlords will be eager to find ways to lure as many relatively 
well-off tenants as possible into the areas where their properties are located. But, of course, there 
is a necessary pre-condition for luring these wealthy tenants to the area and reaping the higher 
rents they are capable of paying: the existing residents of the neighborhood who cannot afford 
higher rents will need to be displaced. In this context, profit-seeking landlords--as well as other 
groups who have an economic incentive to promote gentrification--will have reason to view 
working-class and poor tenants as mere obstacles to increased wealth accumulation. Importantly, 
this will apply not simply to a specific landlord’s current tenants, but indeed to the existing 
neighborhood population writ large, inasmuch as it is unable to afford substantial rent increases. 
For example, in Logan Square, a quickly gentrifying neighborhood on Chicago’s Northwest 
Side, many longtime residents in the area are being quickly displaced by annual rent increases of 
 
 
$600 or more.  The message here, whether stated explicitly or not, is “get out now and make 44
room for wealthier tenants.” 
In some cases, this can take on a xenophobic or racist character whereby anything linked 
to the perceived culture of groups deemed “obstacles to growth” is devalued and stigmatized. In 
cases such as this, the economic project of removing an existing population to make room for 
wealthier tenants who can afford higher rents can become bound up with projects of small-scale 
ethnic or racial cleansing. As Iris Marion Young puts it, in cases such as this, “banks, real estate 
firms, city officials, newspapers, and residents all promote an image of neighborhoods as places 
where only certain kinds of people belong and others do not, deeply reinforcing aversive racism 
and the mechanism by which some groups are constructed as the despised Other.”  These ideas 45
about who belongs in certain spaces and who does not are then often enforced by police, and this 
exacerbates other forms of racial inequality and marginalization. 
These racist dynamics are not necessary outcomes of the process of marginalization I’ve 
been discussing, but they are familiar in the United States given the various ways that urban 
geography and race are tightly linked.  The main point, however, is that uncontrolled rental 46
markets often involve a number of economic pressures that encourage landlords to marginalize 
tenants whose residency in a district prevents higher rents from being reaped. And perhaps most 
importantly, the vagaries of market forces favor the efforts of the landlords and give the tenant 
44 Rice, “Logan Square Residents Protest.” 
45 Young, ​Justice and the Politics​, 247. 
46 For classic studies of this phenomenon, see Massey and Denton (​American Apartheid​); and 
Wilson (​Truly Disadvantaged​). 
 
 
little recourse to resist being pushed to the margins and undermined as a publicly recognized 
member in good standing of the neighborhood. 
 
Landlord/Tenant Relationships: Political Dimensions 
So much for the ways in which the landlord/tenant relation is economically unequal. I now turn 
to a critical examination of its political dimensions. Of course, it might appear at first glance that 
the landlord/tenant relation has little if any political relevance. After all, both tenant and landlord 
alike will (hopefully) have equal voting rights when it comes time to elect local representatives.  47
And, on the face of it, the political balance of power in city hall doesn’t seem to have any 
obvious import when one is busy navigating the rental market in search of an apartment, or 
negotiating the terms of a lease with a landlord. In many respects, rental markets and local 
politics seem to be two very different matters best considered separately. Why, then, should we 
think there are any important political dimensions to the landlord/tenant relationship? 
One political ramification of rising rents is displacement and, in some cases, total 
expulsion from specific political communities. In an uncontrolled rental market, landlords can 
raise rents as they see fit, even if this means displacing tenants that have invested years as well as 
large sums of energy and resources into the neighborhood and city they call home. Take San 
Francisco and Manhattan, for example, both of which are fast becoming, as radical geographer 
47 Note that this is not the case for cities, like Chicago, with large populations of undocumented 
immigrants. Many people with felonies on their record, too, are stripped of the franchise. But for 
the sake of simplicity, we assume in what follows that all landlords and tenants enjoy equal 
formal political rights to vote, hold office, and so on. 
 
 
David Harvey describes it, “vast gated communities for the rich.”  In both cities, soaring rents 48
are pricing out and expelling established working-class communities, forcing them to relocate 
elsewhere. Thus at this very moment, working-class tenants in San Francisco’s Mission District, 
Manhattan’s Harlem, or Chicago’s Pilsen cannot rest assured that their membership in their 
neighborhood or, indeed, in their city’s political community is secure.  On the contrary, their 49
political status as full members is highly precarious and susceptible to being upended at any 
moment. But if one’s status as a member of a political community is liable to be voided by the 
latently coercive market forces driving up rents, there is no plausible sense in which one may be 
said to be the political peer of those who are secure or of those who stand to gain from this 
expulsion. As Michael Walzer puts it, “to uproot a community, to require large-scale migration, 
to deprive people of homes they have lived in for many years; these are ​political ​acts, and acts of 
a rather extreme sort.”  50
Consider the following illustrative example. Suppose you live in a city where rents are 
rising rapidly. As it is, you spend more than 40 percent of your income on rent in the least 
expensive district in the city, whereas you spent less than 25 percent only five years ago. You 
cannot afford to spend more than 45 percent of your income on rent, but if things continue as 
they’ve been going for the last decade, you will soon be priced out of the least expensive district 
of the city, leaving you no option but to move elsewhere--to a different metropolitan area entirely 
48 See Harvey (“Right to the City,” 38). 
49 In the Mission District, average rental prices climbed more than $591 between 2011 and 
2012--a 40 percent increase. See Elson (“Mapping Rental Prices”). 
50 Walzer, ​Spheres of Justice​, 301. 
 
 
or, more likely, to a less expensive suburb just outside of the city. But, of course, once you no 
longer reside within city limits, you are no longer able to vote in citywide elections--at this point 
you’ll cease, in effect, to be a member in good standing in that political community. If nothing is 
done to stop this process, you’ll be expelled (by market forces in conjunction with the 
profit-seeking decisions of landlords) from the political community against your will. 
Now, there are at least two important senses in which this predicament undermines your 
status as a political equal in the city. The first is obvious: you cannot be said to be an equal if you 
are liable to be expelled against your will from the community and thereby denied membership 
and voting rights. The second is less obvious, and pertains to the effects of rising rents on one’s 
status prior to outright expulsion. The basic idea is this: the prospect of future displacement 
undermines one’s ability to influence current political decision making in the city. Other things 
equal, when a group enjoys a stable, secure standing as a member of a political community, 
elected officials will feel at least some pressure to justify their actions in terms that this group 
could be reasonably expected to accept. But when one’s very membership is precarious, the 
ability to exert this pressure on elected representatives is undermined. Like new investors in a 
rapidly gentrifying area of a city, politicians will be under pressure to bet on demographic 
changes and appeal less and less to residents being priced out. The overall result is a diminished 
capability of vulnerable tenants to exert influence on public political decisions. 
I must also point out here that property owners will tend in general to be more politically 
powerful than non-owners--even before displacement is an imminent possibility for poor tenants. 
There at least two reasons for this. The first is that we can expect, other things equal, that 
ideal-typical landlords will have more money to spend influencing political decisions. It’s also 
 
 
likely, other things equal, that they’ll have better access to the networks whereby political 
influence can be exercised.  There is more that could be said about this dynamic if political 51
sociology were our main focus, but hopefully I’ve said enough to establish the rough conclusion 
that there are several forms of political inequality that tend to arise between landlords and tenants 
in uncontrolled markets. 
 
<T1HD>​Egalitarian Counterweights: Rent Control and Other Policies 
<TXT>​If the arguments above are sound, then we have a number of reasons to think that 
landlord/tenant relationships are economically and politically inegalitarian. But this leaves 
unanswered an obvious, pressing question: What should be done about it? A full answer to this 
would no doubt involve a variety of empirical complications that cannot be fully explored here in 
large part because there is no clean, easy way to disentangle landlord/tenant relationships from 
other power relationships in cities. Indeed, for this reason, there is no way to adequately address 
the inequalities I highlight without taking into consideration a number of broader considerations: 
the structures governing political participation and decision making in urban areas, the interplay 
between different units of government (ward vs. city, city vs. county, county vs. state, and so 
51 Other things are not equal, however, when the poor and working-class residents of cities are 
able to organize themselves into coalitions to exert pressure on government via trade unions, 
community organizations, social movements, and political parties that cater to their specific 
needs. This does happen and can have significant effects on city politics. But our point isn’t that 
this is impossible, but rather that the background resource inequalities between landlords and 
tenants tend to favor the former. 
 
 
on), the nature of urban economies more broadly and the employment relationships that 
predominate within them, the roles that race and culture play in urban geography more generally, 
and so on. My goal, then, is relatively modest: I shall argue in what follows that rent control, 
while hardly a panacea, should be seen as a legitimate and effective tool--among others--for 
stemming the economic and political power of landlords over tenants.  52
By “rent control” I mean: public policies that regulate the prices of rental properties in 
urban residential and commercial housing markets. This might take the form of rent ceilings that 
establish an absolute limit that rents may not legally exceed, or it might refer to a system 
whereby annual rent increases may not exceed a certain amount without approval of a review 
panel. What makes all rent control policies distinctive is that they propose to empower a public, 
democratically accountable government body to regulate (increase, lower, freeze, stabilize, etc.) 
prices for rental housing in a specific jurisdiction. 
52 One obvious sense in which rent control is not a panacea, according to the argument I advance 
here, is that it does not propose to ​eliminate​ relations of exploitation between landlords and 
tenants, but merely lessens the ​extent ​of exploitation. What (if anything) should be done to 
replace these exploitative relationships with more egalitarian ones? I don’t have a systematic 
answer to this question. Perhaps some scheme of democratic public ownership--or something 
approximating what Rawls calls “property-owning democracy”--might better serve the 
normative principles defended by relational egalitarians. At any rate, empowering tenants by way 
of rent controls, though not a full solution, does not preclude adherence to (or movement toward) 
some of the more radical goals just mentioned. 
 
 
Before I try to show how rent control might act as an egalitarian counterweight, I must 
say something brief about a common objection to regulating rents in urban housing markets. 
That objection asserts that rent control allegedly decreases the quality and quantity of housing 
because (1) the landlord’s incentive to maintain and/or improve her property will be diminished 
in proportion to the decrease in rents she collects, and (2) lower rents may give existing landlords 
an incentive to disinvest in the rental market altogether whereas many would-be investors in the 
market will be loath to enter it in the first place unless they can expect higher returns. 
The first thing to say here is that even if we grant the empirical dimensions of this 
argument--and, as we’ll see in a moment, it’s not clear that we should--these alone cannot 
decisively settle the normative issues at stake. For instance, as Margaret Jane Radin points out, it 
is entirely reasonable for a consequentialist to ask whether this (potential) loss of efficiency 
might be outweighed by other utility gains produced by rent control.  Perhaps the benefits of 53
rent control for tenants outweigh these potential costs. Put another way: to the complaint that rent 
controls decrease the quantity and quality of rental housing, many working-class tenants can 
reasonably respond that it is hardly a blessing (from their perspective) if the quantity and quality 
of rental housing increases dramatically, but at prices that they simply cannot afford. To this, we 
might also add that even if empirically correct, the normative pull of the standard objection also 
depends on how ​severe ​the decrease in quality and quantity of housing is likely to be. If the 
decrease were extremely small, the argument would hardly be the knockdown refutation it 
53 An example, for instance, would be that rent control increases the disposable income of 
tenants, which can boost effective demand for goods and services and thereby stimulate the local 
economy. 
 
 
purports to be. Surely this is not simply a matter of the viability of rent control as such, but of 
how the specifics of it are configured in practice.  And even if a sufficiently large shortage 54
should arise, there are numerous well-known ways of addressing it while keeping rent controls 
intact, the most obvious being the construction of new, affordable housing stock to expand the 
supply of rental units. What’s more, the entire objection I’ve been considering only holds if we 
assume that consequentialism is true--the non-consequentialist argument I advance, for example, 
implies that a relation can be unjust quite apart from the consequences it has on overall welfare. 
54 To illustrate: if we implemented a rent control regime in Chicago tomorrow that required that 
all rents in city limits be no more than $10 a month, that would surely have catastrophic effects 
on the supply and quality of rental housing in the private housing market. New private 
investment would be nil, and existing landlords would scramble to exit the market--so, too, could 
we expect them to put an immediate halt to spending on maintenance and upkeep. Probably few 
if any landlords would be able to cover their own costs let alone turn a profit. In this sense, the 
“standard objection” is surely correct that fixing rental prices at some sufficiently low level 
would, indeed, have unacceptable consequences. This is no stain on the very idea of rent control, 
however--it merely shows that it matters exactly ​how​ prices are set, ​how​ they are regulated, and 
so on. In rapidly gentrifying neighborhoods in New York, Chicago, or the Bay, for instance, it is 
not clear that imposing a modest cap on annual rent increases would have similarly catastrophic 
results. Yet the way that some economists “gnash their teeth,” as Radin memorably put it, 
whenever rent controls are proposed suggests that some believe that any rent control regime 
whatsoever would bring about catastrophe. This, however, doesn’t seem plausible. 
 
 
Having said all of this about the normative issues implicit in the objection, however, it’s 
not clear that we should grant the empirical dimensions of the argument in the first place. This is 
not an issue I can expect to settle decisively here, but a few remarks can hopefully demonstrate 
why the empirical premises of the “standard objection” are far less obvious upon reflection than 
they may appear at first glance. To see why this is so, note that proponents of the standard 
objection usually take their critique of rent control to be nothing more than a specific instance of 
a general argument against ​any​ form of interference with market prices. The standard objection, 
then, applies as much to minimum wage laws as it does to rent controls. But, as numerous 
empirical studies have shown, many warnings about minimum wage laws--that they will 
decrease overall employment levels, hurt business investment, and so on--are not borne out by 
the facts.  Although the empirical premises of the standard objection surely capture ​some 55
dimension of how individuals respond to price changes in the abstract, this is merely one small 
aspect of what is actually happening in complicated real-world housing markets where 
countervailing forces abound.  56
55 See Schmitt (“Why Does the Minimum Wage Have No Discernible Effect?”); and Pollin and 
Wicks-Lim (“$15 U.S. Minimum Wage”). 
56 I’ll name just two here: First, because rent control boosts the income of tenants, who can be 
expected to spend a higher proportion of their income on immediate consumption than landlords, 
we can expect an increase in effective demand for goods and services produced by the local 
economy. Second, overall economic health--reflected by variables such as employment levels, 
rates of investment, effective demand, and so on--also has important effects on the quantity and 
 
 
So much for our brief detour about a common economic argument against rent control. 
Let us return, then, to the economic aspects of the unequal relationship between tenant and 
landlord to see how rent control might function as an egalitarian counterweight. On the question 
of exploitation, rent control can play a positive role in at least two ways. The first, and most 
obvious, is that it limits the ​rate ​of exploitation--the rate of unreciprocated transfer of goods from 
tenant to landlord--to a fixed amount. Here, the role of rent control is similar to that of the 
minimum wage in labor markets. Minimum wage laws do not, of course, annul the exploitative 
relationship between wage worker and employer, but they do play a role in stemming the rate of 
exploitation. They limit the power of the dominant group to instrumentalize the subordinate, 
exploited group and therefore help to bring the relationship closer to that of equality. 
Another egalitarian impact of rent control--and here, too, there are analogies with 
minimum wage ordinances--is that it increases the economic bargaining power of the tenant by 
subjecting the market transaction between tenant and landlord to parameters that protect the 
interests of the former. If we loosely define economic power as the ability to have one’s wishes 
in an economic transaction satisfied despite the resistance of others, it is clear that rent controls 
economically empower tenants relative to landlords. So, too, of course, can other policies 
economically empower tenants in the market, for example, by increasing the supply of affordable 
housing stock by constructing new units, eliminating restrictive zoning laws that prohibit density 
or multi-family housing, and so on. 
quality of housing. It’s hardly the case that landlord rental income is the single, uniquely 
significant factor in determining housing supply and quality. 
 
 
Whereas a host of policies can help increase the bargaining power of tenants in the 
market, the following benefit seems to be unique to rent controls: rent control can play a role in 
eliminating the vulnerability of tenants to being subject to economic marginalization. Since rent 
controls stop rents from soaring abruptly and pricing out entire layers of existing residents, 
tenants need not worry about impending displacement and landlords lack an incentive to treat 
them as mere obstacles to procuring higher rents. Neither do tenants have to worry that 
improvements (new infrastructure, new business investment, etc.) to their community will result 
in their eventual displacement. They are also not obliged to worry that businesses will bet on 
gentrification occurring and progressively cater less and less to their preferences, whether those 
preferences are economic (for goods and services at an affordable price point) or culturally 
specific. Note that this benefit is not simply about affordability per se, but about geography and 
what sorts of norms should determine who can live where in large, complex urban environments. 
Politically, the egalitarian benefits of rent control are considerable as well, although they 
are seldom taken into account. Perhaps most importantly, rent control can act as a bulwark 
against the market forces that would otherwise expel layers of residents from the political 
community itself. Stabilizing or freezing rents can protect the public status of poor and 
working-class residents as politically equal members in good standing of a particular district or 
city. This, in addition to preventing the disenfranchisement that accompanies geographical 
expulsion, also helps act as a safeguard against the erosion of political influence that is likely to 
afflict a group on the edge of being priced out of given city or district. So, too, does rent 
stabilization act to prevent powerful groups from attempting to solve political disagreement with 
 
 
less powerful groups by non-deliberative, undemocratic means--for example, by seeking to 
displace the groups with whom one disagrees. 
Politically speaking, rent controls also push against a troubling dichotomy elected 
officials face in uncontrolled rental housing markets. Cities need private investment in order to 
sustain healthy employment levels, maintain their tax base, and so on. And private investment is 
only forthcoming in a situation--a “good business climate”--where investors can expect to earn 
sufficient rates of profit on their investments. Officials must then be careful not to spook 
investors and invite capital flight by implementing policies that excessively harm the profitability 
of the private sector. But this places the reform-minded, progressive government official in a 
tough spot. If she promotes “a good business climate,” this risks a situation in which private 
investment soars across the board (in the housing sector as well as other areas of the local 
economy) thereby contributing to quickly increasing residential rents--and eventually the 
displacement of those unable to pay the rents. But, of course, the alternative--deliberately 
ignoring the fact that cities depend upon tax revenue that is premised on private sector economic 
growth--hardly seems like a more promising course of action. The fundamental paradox is that in 
uncontrolled rental markets, there are few options to avoid trade-offs between economic growth 
and housing affordability. 
Rent controls create space to avoid this cul-de-sac by allowing there to be both increasing 
economic investment generally and rental affordability. That is so because rent controls break the 
link between generally increasing economic development (new businesses opening, expansion of 
existing firms, etc.) and increasing rental prices. This allows officials to court commercial 
investment in cities without also, at the same time, making rental housing unaffordable for poor 
 
 
and working-class tenants. What’s more, rent controls work against the paradox whereby poor 
tenants are prevented from enjoying civic improvements without worrying that they are paving 
the way for their own displacement. By preventing displacement, rent control can bolster the 
public standing of tenants and help to ensure that they are not pushed to the margins and ignored 
when decisions about civic improvements are on the table. 
Rent control can also promote equality by ​politicizing ​the question of housing 
affordability and access. Uncontrolled rental markets marginalize and thereby disenfranchise 
tenants from a variety of important decisions about housing and instead actively delegate these 
decisions to the vagaries of the market and the profit-seeking motives of landlords. This point is 
best put in terms of decision-making authority about housing and residency. In an uncontrolled 
rental market, the landlord alone is empowered with the authority to determine how much rent to 
charge and, accordingly, which classes of people can live in a particular city or district. In a 
rent-controlled market, on the other hand, this authority is instead vested in a public entity that is 
democratically accountable to the will of the majority. This has profound consequences for the 
way that decisions about housing will be made. In an uncontrolled market, for example, the 
impersonal laws of the marketplace will insulate the landlord from any obligation to justify her 
decisions about rent to tenants on mutually agreeable terms. 
But this will not be so in a properly controlled market that politicizes such questions by 
making them matters of public democratic debate. “I’m for sharp rent increases because it 
maximizes my income as a landlord” is not likely to be a winning argument in the public 
political context but would easily satisfy the very different requirements of the marketplace. 
Politicizing the question of rental prices also helps unite tenants as a group with similar interests, 
 
 
whereas the marketplace tends to leave individual buyers atomized in a condition of competition 
vis-à-vis one another. The result, then, is akin to some of the features of collective bargaining in 
labor markets, and the benefits for tenants are analogous--no longer must the individual tenant 
bargain as an isolated buyer competing with others. Now she can, in effect, bargain with her 
fellow tenants for a better deal across the board. To be sure, this does not necessarily guarantee 
that tenants as a group will be able to politically determine rental prices as equals in relation to 
landlords--there is a lot more to say here than I have the space to discuss about problems of 
political inequality in large cities. But it is surely a great step toward equality to move the 
conflict between landlords and tenants from the fragmented, money-driven environment of the 
marketplace to the relatively democratic, deliberative space of the public forum, where the rule is 
one person, one vote. 
 
Conclusion 
If the arguments advanced in the previous section have been convincing, we have reason to think 
that rent controls should be seen as legitimate egalitarian counterweights to the inequalities built 
into private rental housing markets. But even if objections can be mustered that give us reason to 
doubt either the legitimacy or effectiveness of rent controls, the normative arguments of the 
preceding sections still stand on their own. In practical terms, that means that there appear to be 
fundamental ways in which landlord/tenant relationships are inegalitarian and therefore at odds 
with our considered judgments about justice. Regardless of which remedies are ultimately put 
forward to address the problem, hopefully the arguments advanced above have clarified what is 
 
 
 
at stake and what form a morally acceptable solution to the rental housing crisis in large US 
cities might take. 
 
Northeastern Illinois University 
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